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authorB. Watson <yalhcru@gmail.com>2022-03-19 12:57:49 -0400
committerWilly Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>2022-03-20 20:45:16 +0700
commit31b4a7eef6c62fe3cd3530851e77eff1f28f0f4b (patch)
treea9f34b35e589b2b64135188bf43273cb25ecc913 /network/uudeview/patches
parentb7733ec8bae7e15ab5897dd5c5f34506f247e1c5 (diff)
downloadslackbuilds-31b4a7eef6c62fe3cd3530851e77eff1f28f0f4b.tar.gz
network/uudeview: Fix 32-bit build.
Signed-off-by: B. Watson <yalhcru@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'network/uudeview/patches')
-rw-r--r--network/uudeview/patches/025_CAN-2004-2265.diff42
-rw-r--r--network/uudeview/patches/034_do_not_ignore_special_chars.diff22
-rw-r--r--network/uudeview/patches/037_CVE-2008-2266_symlink.diff182
-rw-r--r--network/uudeview/patches/043_string_format_issue.diff24
-rw-r--r--network/uudeview/patches/049_glibc_2.27.diff20
5 files changed, 290 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/network/uudeview/patches/025_CAN-2004-2265.diff b/network/uudeview/patches/025_CAN-2004-2265.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d89ef9a098
--- /dev/null
+++ b/network/uudeview/patches/025_CAN-2004-2265.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Description: CAN-2004-2265
+ Fix possible (but highly unlikely) race in temporary file generation
+ (CAN-2004-2265), by passing the "x" (O_EXCL) flag to fopen when opening
+ such files. (Closes: #320541)
+ 0.5.20-2.1
+Author: Steinar H. Gunderson <sesse@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/320541
+
+--- a/unix/uudeview.c
++++ b/unix/uudeview.c
+@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ proc_stdin (void)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+- if ((target = fopen (stdfile, "wb")) == NULL) {
++ if ((target = fopen (stdfile, "wbx")) == NULL) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "proc_stdin: cannot open temp file %s for writing: %s\n",
+ stdfile, strerror (errno));
+ _FP_free (stdfile);
+--- a/uulib/uunconc.c
++++ b/uulib/uunconc.c
+@@ -1325,9 +1325,9 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ return UURET_NODATA;
+
+ if (data->uudet == PT_ENCODED)
+- mode = "wt"; /* open text files in text mode */
++ mode = "wtx"; /* open text files in text mode */
+ else
+- mode = "wb"; /* otherwise in binary */
++ mode = "wbx"; /* otherwise in binary */
+
+ if ((data->binfile = tempnam (NULL, "uu")) == NULL) {
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+@@ -1502,7 +1502,7 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ progress.action = 0;
+ return UURET_NOMEM;
+ }
+- if ((datain = fopen (data->binfile, "rb")) == NULL) {
++ if ((datain = fopen (data->binfile, "rbx")) == NULL) {
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+ uustring (S_NOT_OPEN_FILE),
+ data->binfile, strerror (uu_errno = errno));
diff --git a/network/uudeview/patches/034_do_not_ignore_special_chars.diff b/network/uudeview/patches/034_do_not_ignore_special_chars.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4ee32469fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/network/uudeview/patches/034_do_not_ignore_special_chars.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+Description: Don't ignore special chars when parsing MIME.
+ 0.5.20-3
+Author: Chris Hanson
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/341440
+
+--- a/uulib/uuscan.c
++++ b/uulib/uuscan.c
+@@ -387,10 +387,10 @@ ParseValue (char *attribute)
+ *attribute != '(' && *attribute != ')' &&
+ *attribute != '<' && *attribute != '>' &&
+ *attribute != '@' && *attribute != ',' &&
+- /* *attribute != ';' && */ *attribute != ':' &&
+- *attribute != '\\' &&*attribute != '"' &&
+- *attribute != '/' && /* *attribute != '[' &&
+- *attribute != ']' && */ *attribute != '?' &&
++ *attribute != ';' && *attribute != ':' &&
++ *attribute != '\\' && *attribute != '"' &&
++ *attribute != '/' && *attribute != '[' &&
++ *attribute != ']' && *attribute != '?' &&
+ *attribute != '=' && length < 255) {
+ *ptr++ = *attribute++;
+ length++;
diff --git a/network/uudeview/patches/037_CVE-2008-2266_symlink.diff b/network/uudeview/patches/037_CVE-2008-2266_symlink.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7a74e4792c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/network/uudeview/patches/037_CVE-2008-2266_symlink.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+Description: Fixed a classical tempfile symlink attack vulnerability in libuu.
+ See Version: 0.5.20-3.1.
+Author: Nico Golde <nion@debian.org>
+Bug-Debian: http://bugs.debian.org/480972
+
+--- a/uulib/uunconc.c
++++ b/uulib/uunconc.c
+@@ -1311,6 +1311,11 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ char *mode, *ntmp;
+ uufile *iter;
+ size_t bytes;
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ int tmpfd;
++ const char *tmpprefix = "uuXXXXXX";
++ char *tmpdir = NULL;
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+
+ if (data == NULL || data->thisfile == NULL)
+ return UURET_ILLVAL;
+@@ -1329,13 +1334,35 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ else
+ mode = "wbx"; /* otherwise in binary */
+
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ if ((getuid()==geteuid()) && (getgid()==getegid())) {
++ tmpdir=getenv("TMPDIR");
++ }
++
++ if (!tmpdir) {
++ tmpdir = "/tmp";
++ }
++ data->binfile = malloc(strlen(tmpdir)+strlen(tmpprefix)+2);
++
++ if (!data->binfile) {
++#else
+ if ((data->binfile = tempnam (NULL, "uu")) == NULL) {
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+ uustring (S_NO_TEMP_NAME));
+ return UURET_NOMEM;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ strcpy(data->binfile, tmpdir);
++ strcat(data->binfile, "/");
++ strcat(data->binfile, tmpprefix);
++
++ if ((tmpfd = mkstemp(data->binfile)) == -1 ||
++ (dataout = fdopen(tmpfd, mode)) == NULL) {
++#else
+ if ((dataout = fopen (data->binfile, mode)) == NULL) {
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ /*
+ * we couldn't create a temporary file. Usually this means that TMP
+ * and TEMP aren't set
+@@ -1343,6 +1370,12 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+ uustring (S_WR_ERR_TARGET),
+ data->binfile, strerror (uu_errno = errno));
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ if (tmpfd != -1) {
++ unlink(data->binfile);
++ close(tmpfd);
++ }
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ _FP_free (data->binfile);
+ data->binfile = NULL;
+ uu_errno = errno;
+@@ -1499,7 +1532,13 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ */
+
+ if (data->uudet == BH_ENCODED && data->binfile) {
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ ntmp = malloc(strlen(tmpdir)+strlen(tmpprefix)+2);
++
++ if (ntmp == NULL) {
++#else
+ if ((ntmp = tempnam (NULL, "uu")) == NULL) {
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+ uustring (S_NO_TEMP_NAME));
+ progress.action = 0;
+@@ -1513,15 +1552,31 @@ UUDecode (uulist *data)
+ free (ntmp);
+ return UURET_IOERR;
+ }
++
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ strcpy(ntmp, tmpdir);
++ strcat(ntmp, "/");
++ strcat(ntmp, tmpprefix);
++ if ((tmpfd = mkstemp(ntmp)) == -1 ||
++ (dataout = fdopen(tmpfd, "wb")) == NULL) {
++#else
+ if ((dataout = fopen (ntmp, "wb")) == NULL) {
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ UUMessage (uunconc_id, __LINE__, UUMSG_ERROR,
+ uustring (S_NOT_OPEN_TARGET),
+ ntmp, strerror (uu_errno = errno));
+ progress.action = 0;
+ fclose (datain);
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ if (tmpfd != -1) {
++ unlink(ntmp);
++ close(tmpfd);
++ }
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+ free (ntmp);
+ return UURET_IOERR;
+ }
++
+ /*
+ * read fork lengths. remember they're in Motorola format
+ */
+--- a/uulib/configure.in
++++ b/uulib/configure.in
+@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(io.h sys/time.h)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(gettimeofday)
+
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(tempnam,,AC_DEFINE(tempnam,_FP_tempnam))
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mkstemp])
+
+ #
+ # strerror might be internally defined. this would cause a
+--- a/unix/uudeview.c
++++ b/unix/uudeview.c
+@@ -443,18 +443,45 @@ proc_stdin (void)
+ FILE *target;
+ size_t bytes;
+ int res;
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ int tmpfd;
++ const char *tmpprefix = "uuXXXXXX";
++ char *tmpdir = NULL;
++#endif /* HAVE_MKSTEMP */
+
+ if (stdinput) {
+ fprintf (stderr, "proc_stdin: cannot process stdin twice\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ if ((getuid()==geteuid()) && (getgid()==getegid())) {
++ tmpdir=getenv("TMPDIR");
++ }
++
++ if (!tmpdir) {
++ tmpdir = "/tmp";
++ }
++ stdfile = malloc(strlen(tmpdir)+strlen(tmpprefix)+2);
++
++ if (!stdfile) {
++#else
+ if ((stdfile = tempnam (NULL, "uu")) == NULL) {
++#endif
+ fprintf (stderr, "proc_stdin: cannot get temporary file\n");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
++#ifdef HAVE_MKSTEMP
++ strcpy(stdfile, tmpdir);
++ strcat(stdfile, "/");
++ strcat(stdfile, tmpprefix);
++
++ if ((tmpfd = mkstemp(stdfile)) == -1 ||
++ (target = fdopen(tmpfd, "wbx")) == NULL) {
++#else
+ if ((target = fopen (stdfile, "wbx")) == NULL) {
++#endif
+ fprintf (stderr, "proc_stdin: cannot open temp file %s for writing: %s\n",
+ stdfile, strerror (errno));
+ _FP_free (stdfile);
+--- a/configure.in
++++ b/configure.in
+@@ -510,6 +510,7 @@ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(io.h sys/time.h)
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(getcwd popen gettimeofday isatty)
+
+ AC_CHECK_FUNC(tempnam,,AC_DEFINE(tempnam,_FP_tempnam))
++AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mkstemp])
+
+ #
+ # strerror might be internally defined. this would cause a
diff --git a/network/uudeview/patches/043_string_format_issue.diff b/network/uudeview/patches/043_string_format_issue.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7cbc584f5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/network/uudeview/patches/043_string_format_issue.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Description: Fix potential security issue (arbitrary string being passed
+ as a format string to fprintf).
+Author: Andrew Shadura <andrewsh@debian.org>
+
+--- a/unix/uuenview.c
++++ b/unix/uuenview.c
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ SendMkCommand (char **rcptlist, char *to
+ }
+
+ if ((*rcptlist = (char *) malloc (strlen (towhom) + 16)) == NULL) {
+- fprintf (stderr, "error: Out of memory allocating %d bytes\n",
++ fprintf (stderr, "error: Out of memory allocating %zd bytes\n",
+ strlen (towhom)+16);
+ _FP_free (command);
+ return NULL;
+@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ AttachFiles (char *towhom, char *subject
+ if (_FP_stristr (input, "multipart") != NULL) {
+ /* it is already a multipart posting. grab the boundary */
+ if ((ptr = _FP_stristr (input, "boundary=")) != NULL) {
+- fprintf(thepipe, input);
++ fprintf(thepipe, "%s", input);
+ strcpy (boundary, ParseValue (ptr));
+ hadmulti = 1;
+ }
diff --git a/network/uudeview/patches/049_glibc_2.27.diff b/network/uudeview/patches/049_glibc_2.27.diff
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c41fd5c3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/network/uudeview/patches/049_glibc_2.27.diff
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+Description: Remove a hack for Sun that causes FTBFS with glibc >= 2.27
+Author: Adrian Bunk <bunk@debian.org>
+
+--- uudeview-0.5.20.orig/tcl/uutcl.c
++++ uudeview-0.5.20/tcl/uutcl.c
+@@ -48,14 +48,6 @@
+ #include <tcl.h>
+ #endif
+
+-/*
+- * The following variable is a special hack that is needed in order for
+- * Sun shared libraries to be used for Tcl.
+- */
+-
+-extern int matherr();
+-int *tclDummyMathPtr = (int *) matherr;
+-
+ #include <uudeview.h>
+ #include <uuint.h>
+ #include <fptools.h>