Fri May 25 23:29:36 UTC 201814.2

patches/packages/glibc-zoneinfo-2018e-noarch-2_slack14.2.txz:  Rebuilt.
  Handle removal of US/Pacific-New timezone. If we see that the machine is
  using this, it will be automatically switched to US/Pacific.

1 files changed, 274 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/patches/source/xscreensaver/setuid.c b/patches/source/xscreensaver/setuid.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..343dcf09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/patches/source/xscreensaver/setuid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
+/* setuid.c --- management of runtime privileges.
+ * xscreensaver, Copyright (c) 1993-1998 Jamie Zawinski <jwz@jwz.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, distribute, and sell this software and its
+ * documentation for any purpose is hereby granted without fee, provided that
+ * the above copyright notice appear in all copies and that both that
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in supporting
+ * documentation.  No representations are made about the suitability of this
+ * software for any purpose.  It is provided "as is" without express or 
+ * implied warranty.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
+# include "config.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>		/* not used for much... */
+
+/* This file doesn't need the Xt headers, so stub these types out... */
+#undef XtPointer
+#define XtAppContext void*
+#define XrmDatabase  void*
+#define XtIntervalId void*
+#define XtPointer    void*
+#define Widget       void*
+
+#include "xscreensaver.h"
+
+#ifndef EPERM
+#include <errno.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <pwd.h>		/* for getpwnam() and struct passwd */
+#include <grp.h>		/* for getgrgid() and struct group */
+
+static const char *
+uid_gid_string (uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+{
+  static char buf[255];
+  struct passwd *p = 0;
+  struct group *g = 0;
+  p = getpwuid (uid);
+  g = getgrgid (gid);
+  sprintf (buf, "%s/%s (%ld/%ld)",
+	   (p && p->pw_name ? p->pw_name : "???"),
+	   (g && g->gr_name ? g->gr_name : "???"),
+	   (long) uid, (long) gid);
+  return buf;
+}
+
+
+void
+describe_uids (saver_info *si, FILE *out)
+{
+  uid_t uid = getuid();
+  gid_t gid = getgid();
+  uid_t euid = geteuid();
+  gid_t egid = getegid();
+  char *s1 = strdup (uid_gid_string (uid, gid));
+  char *s2 = strdup (uid_gid_string (euid, egid));
+
+  if (si->orig_uid && *si->orig_uid &&
+      (!!strcmp (si->orig_uid, s1) ||
+       !!strcmp (si->orig_uid, s2)))
+    fprintf (out, "%s: initial effective uid/gid was %s\n", blurb(),
+	     si->orig_uid);
+
+  fprintf (out, "%s: running as %s", blurb(), s1);
+  if (uid != euid || gid != egid)
+    fprintf (out, "; effectively %s", s2);
+  fprintf(out, "\n");
+  free(s1);
+  free(s2);
+}
+
+
+static int
+set_ids_by_number (uid_t uid, gid_t gid, char **message_ret)
+{
+  int uid_errno = 0;
+  int gid_errno = 0;
+  struct passwd *p = getpwuid (uid);
+  struct group  *g = getgrgid (gid);
+
+  if (message_ret)
+    *message_ret = 0;
+
+  /* Rumor has it that some implementations of of setuid() do nothing
+     when called with -1; therefore, if the "nobody" user has a uid of
+     -1, then that would be Really Bad.  Rumor further has it that such
+     systems really ought to be using -2 for "nobody", since that works.
+     So, if we get a uid (or gid, for good measure) of -1, switch to -2
+     instead.  Note that this must be done after we've looked up the
+     user/group names with getpwuid(-1) and/or getgrgid(-1).
+   */
+  if (gid == (gid_t) -1) gid = (gid_t) -2;
+  if (uid == (uid_t) -1) uid = (uid_t) -2;
+
+  errno = 0;
+  if (setgid (gid) != 0)
+    gid_errno = errno ? errno : -1;
+
+  errno = 0;
+  if (setuid (uid) != 0)
+    uid_errno = errno ? errno : -1;
+
+  if (uid_errno == 0 && gid_errno == 0)
+    {
+      static char buf [1024];
+      sprintf (buf, "changed uid/gid to %s/%s (%ld/%ld).",
+	       (p && p->pw_name ? p->pw_name : "???"),
+               (g && g->gr_name ? g->gr_name : "???"),
+	       (long) uid, (long) gid);
+      if (message_ret)
+	*message_ret = buf;
+      return 0;
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      char buf [1024];
+      if (gid_errno)
+	{
+	  sprintf (buf, "%s: couldn't set gid to %s (%ld)",
+		   blurb(),
+		   (g && g->gr_name ? g->gr_name : "???"),
+		   (long) gid);
+	  if (gid_errno == -1)
+	    fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown error\n", buf);
+	  else
+	    perror(buf);
+	}
+
+      if (uid_errno)
+	{
+	  sprintf (buf, "%s: couldn't set uid to %s (%ld)",
+		   blurb(),
+		   (p && p->pw_name ? p->pw_name : "???"),
+		   (long) uid);
+	  if (uid_errno == -1)
+	    fprintf(stderr, "%s: unknown error\n", buf);
+	  else
+	    perror(buf);
+	}
+
+      return -1;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* If we've been run as setuid or setgid to someone else (most likely root)
+   turn off the extra permissions so that random user-specified programs
+   don't get special privileges.  (On some systems it is necessary to install
+   this program as setuid root in order to read the passwd file to implement
+   lock-mode.)
+
+     *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CODE!
+         If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
+         of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS", 
+         and "USING XDM".
+ */
+void
+hack_uid (saver_info *si)
+{
+
+  /* Discard privileges, and set the effective user/group ids to the
+     real user/group ids.  That is, give up our "chmod +s" rights.
+   */
+  {
+    uid_t euid = geteuid();
+    gid_t egid = getegid();
+    uid_t uid = getuid();
+    gid_t gid = getgid();
+
+    si->orig_uid = strdup (uid_gid_string (euid, egid));
+
+    if (uid != euid || gid != egid)
+      if (set_ids_by_number (uid, gid, &si->uid_message) != 0)
+	saver_exit (si, 1, 0);
+  }
+
+
+  /* Locking can't work when running as root, because we have no way of
+     knowing what the user id of the logged in user is (so we don't know
+     whose password to prompt for.)
+
+     *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
+         If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
+         of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS",
+         and "USING XDM".
+   */
+  if (getuid() == (uid_t) 0)
+    {
+      si->locking_disabled_p = True;
+      si->nolock_reason = "running as root";
+    }
+
+
+  /* If we're running as root, switch to a safer user.  This is above and
+     beyond the fact that we've disabling locking, above -- the theory is
+     that running graphics demos as root is just always a stupid thing
+     to do, since they have probably never been security reviewed and are
+     more likely to be buggy than just about any other kind of program.
+     (And that assumes non-malicious code.  There are also attacks here.)
+
+     *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
+         If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
+         of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS", 
+         and "USING XDM".
+   */
+  if (getuid() == (uid_t) 0)
+    {
+      struct passwd *p;
+
+      p = getpwnam ("nobody");
+      if (! p) p = getpwnam ("noaccess");
+      if (! p) p = getpwnam ("daemon");
+      if (! p)
+	{
+	  fprintf (stderr,
+		   "%s: running as root, and couldn't find a safer uid.\n",
+		   blurb());
+	  saver_exit(si, 1, 0);
+	}
+
+      if (set_ids_by_number (p->pw_uid, p->pw_gid, &si->uid_message) != 0)
+	saver_exit (si, -1, 0);
+    }
+
+
+  /* If there's anything even remotely funny looking about the passwd struct,
+     or if we're running as some other user from the list below (a
+     non-comprehensive selection of users known to be privileged in some way,
+     and not normal end-users) then disable locking.  If it was possible,
+     switching to "nobody" would be the thing to do, but only root itself has
+     the privs to do that.
+
+     *** WARNING: DO NOT DISABLE THIS CODE!
+         If you do so, you will open a security hole.  See the sections
+         of the xscreensaver manual titled "LOCKING AND ROOT LOGINS",
+         and "USING XDM".
+   */
+  {
+    uid_t uid = getuid ();		/* get it again */
+    struct passwd *p = getpwuid (uid);	/* get it again */
+
+    if (!p ||
+	uid == (uid_t)  0 ||
+	uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
+	uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
+	p->pw_uid == (uid_t)  0 ||
+	p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -1 ||
+	p->pw_uid == (uid_t) -2 ||
+	!p->pw_name ||
+	!*p->pw_name ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "root") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "nobody") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "noaccess") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "operator") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "daemon") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "bin") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "adm") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "sys") ||
+	!strcmp (p->pw_name, "games"))
+      {
+	static char buf [1024];
+	sprintf (buf, "running as %s",
+		 (p && p->pw_name && *p->pw_name
+		  ? p->pw_name : "<unknown>"));
+	si->nolock_reason = buf;
+	si->locking_disabled_p = True;
+	si->dangerous_uid_p = True;
+      }
+  }
+}