From e1cf674191c37e14f504cd47cdff22a31ecb3bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: dsomero Date: Sun, 23 May 2010 14:01:40 -0400 Subject: network/openvas-administrator: Miscellaneous cleanups and patch. Cleaned up build and added an upstream patch. --- .../openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+) create mode 100644 network/openvas-administrator/openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch (limited to 'network/openvas-administrator/openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch') diff --git a/network/openvas-administrator/openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch b/network/openvas-administrator/openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..2a0e0add11 --- /dev/null +++ b/network/openvas-administrator/openvas-administrator-0.7.0-format.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +Index: src/oap.c +=================================================================== +--- src/oap.c ++++ src/oap.c +@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ + if (((buffer_size_t) TO_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE) - to_client_end + < strlen (msg)) + { +- tracef (" send_to_client out of space (%i < %i)\n", ++ tracef (" send_to_client out of space (%i < %zu)\n", + ((buffer_size_t) TO_CLIENT_BUFFER_SIZE) - to_client_end, + strlen (msg)); + return TRUE; +Index: src/oxpd.c +=================================================================== +--- src/oxpd.c ++++ src/oxpd.c +@@ -247,7 +247,8 @@ + tracef ("<= client Input may contain password, suppressed.\n"); + else + tracef ("<= client \"%.*s\"\n", +- count, ++ /* Cast is safe because count is bounded by from_client size. */ ++ (int) count, + from_client + from_client_end); + #else + tracef ("<= client %i bytes\n", count); -- cgit v1.2.3