diff options
| author | Brenton Earl <brent@exitstatusone.com> | 2018-10-20 20:38:27 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Willy Sudiarto Raharjo <willysr@slackbuilds.org> | 2018-10-21 06:47:01 +0700 |
| commit | bd8fc76650e0d16eb2951527ff03e46e957fe1ec (patch) | |
| tree | 8b93aecf29f26854051bbafe34b1a58a23f7e271 /network | |
| parent | a612eac81af4c109fca7c5469d0b0b09b49678b2 (diff) | |
| download | slackbuilds-bd8fc76650e0d16eb2951527ff03e46e957fe1ec.tar.gz | |
network/hostapd: Patched to fix CVE-2018-14526.
When an attacker sends unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL key data,
hostapd should ignore it.
(* Security fix *)
Signed-off-by: David Spencer <baildon.research@googlemail.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'network')
| -rw-r--r-- | network/hostapd/hostapd.SlackBuild | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | network/hostapd/patches/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch | 44 |
2 files changed, 45 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/network/hostapd/hostapd.SlackBuild b/network/hostapd/hostapd.SlackBuild index 2ed9662796..6a519a3787 100644 --- a/network/hostapd/hostapd.SlackBuild +++ b/network/hostapd/hostapd.SlackBuild @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ PRGNAM=hostapd VERSION=${VERSION:-2.6} -BUILD=${BUILD:-2} +BUILD=${BUILD:-3} TAG=${TAG:-_SBo} if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then diff --git a/network/hostapd/patches/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch b/network/hostapd/patches/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..a62b52c6b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/network/hostapd/patches/rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 3e34cfdff6b192fe337c6fb3f487f73e96582961 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +Date: Sun, 15 Jul 2018 01:25:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] WPA: Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data + +Ignore unauthenticated encrypted EAPOL-Key data in supplicant +processing. When using WPA2, these are frames that have the Encrypted +flag set, but not the MIC flag. + +When using WPA2, EAPOL-Key frames that had the Encrypted flag set but +not the MIC flag, had their data field decrypted without first verifying +the MIC. In case the data field was encrypted using RC4 (i.e., when +negotiating TKIP as the pairwise cipher), this meant that +unauthenticated but decrypted data would then be processed. An adversary +could abuse this as a decryption oracle to recover sensitive information +in the data field of EAPOL-Key messages (e.g., the group key). +(CVE-2018-14526) + +Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be> +--- + src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff -upr wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c +--- wpa_supplicant-2.6.orig/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2016-10-02 21:51:11.000000000 +0300 ++++ wpa_supplicant-2.6/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c 2018-08-08 16:55:11.506831029 +0300 +@@ -2016,6 +2016,17 @@ int wpa_sm_rx_eapol(struct wpa_sm *sm, c + + if ((sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_RSN || sm->proto == WPA_PROTO_OSEN) && + (key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_ENCR_KEY_DATA)) { ++ /* ++ * Only decrypt the Key Data field if the frame's authenticity ++ * was verified. When using AES-SIV (FILS), the MIC flag is not ++ * set, so this check should only be performed if mic_len != 0 ++ * which is the case in this code branch. ++ */ ++ if (!(key_info & WPA_KEY_INFO_MIC)) { ++ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING, ++ "WPA: Ignore EAPOL-Key with encrypted but unauthenticated data"); ++ goto out; ++ } + if (wpa_supplicant_decrypt_key_data(sm, key, ver, key_data, + &key_data_len)) + goto out; |