network/opensmtpd: Updated for version 6.6.4p1.

Signed-off-by: Matteo Bernardini <ponce@slackbuilds.org>

8 files changed, 44 insertions, 398 deletions

diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/aliases b/network/opensmtpd/aliases
index ea54878974..85cc8e71ac 100644
--- a/network/opensmtpd/aliases
+++ b/network/opensmtpd/aliases
@@ -1,23 +1,49 @@
-# See aliases(5) for more information
+# Sample aliases file installed in /etc/opensmtpd/aliases
+#
+# Aliases in this file will NOT be expanded in the header from
+# Mail, but WILL be visible over networks or from /usr/libexec/mail.local.
+#
+#       >>>>>>>>>>      The program "newaliases" must be run after
+#       >> NOTE >>      this file is updated for any changes to
+#       >>>>>>>>>>      show through to smtpd.
+#
+
+# Person who should get root's mail. Don't receive mail as root!
+#root:          you
 
 # Basic system aliases -- these MUST be present
 MAILER-DAEMON:  postmaster
 postmaster:     root
 
 # General redirections for pseudo accounts
-bin:            root
 daemon:         root
 named:          root
-nobody:         root
 uucp:           root
 www:            root
 ftp-bugs:       root
 
+# Redirections for pseudo accounts that should not receive mail
+bin:    /dev/null
+build:  /dev/null
+nobody: /dev/null
+sshd:   /dev/null
+
 # Well-known aliases
 manager:        root
 dumper:         root
 operator:       root
-abuse:          postmaster
+
+# RFC 2142: NETWORK OPERATIONS MAILBOX NAMES
+abuse:          root
+# noc:          root
+security:       root
+
+# RFC 2142: SUPPORT MAILBOX NAMES FOR SPECIFIC INTERNET SERVICES
+# hostmaster:   root
+# usenet:       root
+# news:         usenet
+# webmaster:    root
+# ftp:          root
 
 # trap decode to catch security attacks
 decode:         root
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/fix-crash-on-authentication.patch b/network/opensmtpd/fix-crash-on-authentication.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c20b5e0a0e..0000000000
--- a/network/opensmtpd/fix-crash-on-authentication.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 9b5f70b93e038df5446bd37a4adac5a0380748e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: johannes <johannes.brechtmann@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 21 Feb 2018 23:57:11 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] crypt_checkpass: include HAVE_CRYPT_H definition, add NULL
- check
-
----
- openbsd-compat/crypt_checkpass.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/crypt_checkpass.c b/openbsd-compat/crypt_checkpass.c
-index dafd2dae..d10b3a57 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/crypt_checkpass.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/crypt_checkpass.c
-@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
- /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypt/cryptutil.c */
- 
-+#include "includes.h"
- #include <errno.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
- #include <crypt.h>
-@@ -10,6 +11,8 @@
- int
- crypt_checkpass(const char *pass, const char *goodhash)
- {
-+	char *c;
-+
- 	if (goodhash == NULL)
- 		goto fail;
- 
-@@ -17,7 +20,11 @@ crypt_checkpass(const char *pass, const char *goodhash)
- 	if (strlen(goodhash) == 0 && strlen(pass) == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
--	if (strcmp(crypt(pass, goodhash), goodhash) == 0)
-+	c = crypt(pass, goodhash);
-+	if (c == NULL)
-+		goto fail;
-+
-+	if (strcmp(c, goodhash) == 0)
- 		return 0;
- 
- fail:
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd64-020-smtpd.patch b/network/opensmtpd/openbsd64-020-smtpd.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8ce7178da8..0000000000
--- a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd64-020-smtpd.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-OpenBSD 6.4 errata 020, August 2, 2019
-
-smtpd can crash on excessively large input, causing a denial of service.
-
---- a/smtpd/smtp_session.c	3 Sep 2018 19:01:29 -0000	1.337
-+++ b/smtpd/smtp_session.c	1 Aug 2019 21:18:53 -0000
-@@ -1904,15 +1904,21 @@ smtp_reply(struct smtp_session *s, char 
- {
- 	va_list	 ap;
- 	int	 n;
--	char	 buf[LINE_MAX], tmp[LINE_MAX];
-+	char	 buf[LINE_MAX*2], tmp[LINE_MAX*2];
- 
- 	va_start(ap, fmt);
- 	n = vsnprintf(buf, sizeof buf, fmt, ap);
- 	va_end(ap);
--	if (n == -1 || n >= LINE_MAX)
--		fatalx("smtp_reply: line too long");
-+	if (n < 0)
-+		fatalx("smtp_reply: response format error");
- 	if (n < 4)
- 		fatalx("smtp_reply: response too short");
-+	if (n >= (int)sizeof buf) {
-+		/* only first three bytes are used by SMTP logic,
-+		 * so if _our_ reply does not fit entirely in the
-+		 * buffer, it's ok to truncate.
-+		 */
-+	}
- 
- 	log_trace(TRACE_SMTP, "smtp: %p: >>> %s", s, buf);
- 
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-029-smptd-tls.patch b/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-029-smptd-tls.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a2727decf8..0000000000
--- a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-029-smptd-tls.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-OpenBSD 6.5 errata 029, January 30, 2020:
-
-smtpd can crash on opportunistic TLS downgrade, causing a denial of service.
-
---- usr.sbin/smtpd/mta_session.c	23 Dec 2018 16:37:53 -0000	1.115
-+++ usr.sbin/smtpd/mta_session.c	20 Jan 2020 10:36:58 -0000
-@@ -1292,40 +1292,20 @@ mta_io(struct io *io, int evt, void *arg
- 		break;
- 
- 	case IO_ERROR:
-+	case IO_TLSERROR:
- 		log_debug("debug: mta: %p: IO error: %s", s, io_error(io));
--		if (!s->ready) {
--			mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io_error(io));
--			mta_connect(s);
--			break;
--		}
--		else if (!(s->flags & (MTA_FORCE_TLS|MTA_FORCE_SMTPS|MTA_FORCE_ANYSSL))) {
--			/* error in non-strict SSL negotiation, downgrade to plain */
--			if (s->flags & MTA_TLS) {
--				log_info("smtp-out: Error on session %016"PRIx64
--				    ": opportunistic TLS failed, "
--				    "downgrading to plain", s->id);
--				s->flags &= ~MTA_TLS;
--				s->flags |= MTA_DOWNGRADE_PLAIN;
--				mta_connect(s);
--				break;
--			}
--		}
--		mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io_error(io));
--		mta_free(s);
--		break;
- 
--	case IO_TLSERROR:
--		log_debug("debug: mta: %p: TLS IO error: %s", s, io_error(io));
--		if (!(s->flags & (MTA_FORCE_TLS|MTA_FORCE_SMTPS|MTA_FORCE_ANYSSL))) {
-+		if (s->state == MTA_STARTTLS && s->use_smtp_tls) {
- 			/* error in non-strict SSL negotiation, downgrade to plain */
--			log_info("smtp-out: TLS Error on session %016"PRIx64
--			    ": TLS failed, "
-+			log_info("smtp-out: Error on session %016"PRIx64
-+			    ": opportunistic TLS failed, "
- 			    "downgrading to plain", s->id);
- 			s->flags &= ~MTA_TLS;
- 			s->flags |= MTA_DOWNGRADE_PLAIN;
- 			mta_connect(s);
- 			break;
- 		}
-+
- 		mta_error(s, "IO Error: %s", io_error(io));
- 		mta_free(s);
- 		break;
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-031-smtpd-envelope.patch b/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-031-smtpd-envelope.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index cd59f1d6fa..0000000000
--- a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd65-031-smtpd-envelope.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
-OpenBSD 6.5 errata 031, February 24, 2020:
-
-An out of bounds read in smtpd allows an attacker to inject arbitrary
-commands into the envelope file which are then executed as root.
-Separately, missing privilege revocation in smtpctl allows arbitrary
-commands to be run with the _smtpq group.
-
---- a/smtpd/makemap.c.orig	2018-01-10 05:06:40.000000000 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/makemap.c	2020-02-24 15:41:18.278340410 -0800
-@@ -105,8 +105,13 @@ makemap(int prog_mode, int argc, char *a
- 	int		 ch, dbputs = 0, Uflag = 0;
- 	DBTYPE		 dbtype = DB_HASH;
- 	char		*p;
-+	gid_t		gid;
- 	int		 fd = -1;
- 
-+	gid = getgid();
-+	if (setresgid(gid, gid, gid) == -1)
-+		err(1, "setresgid");
-+
- 	log_init(1, LOG_MAIL);
- 
- 	mode = prog_mode;
-@@ -180,9 +185,9 @@ makemap(int prog_mode, int argc, char *a
- 				errx(1, "database name too long");
- 		}
- 
--		execlp("makemap", "makemap", "-d", argv[0], "-o", dbname, "-",
--		    (char *)NULL);
--		err(1, "execlp");
-+		execl(PATH_MAKEMAP, "makemap", "-d", argv[0], "-o", dbname,
-+		     "-", (char *)NULL);
-+		err(1, "execl");
- 	}
- 
- 	if (mode == P_NEWALIASES) {
---- a/smtpd/mta_session.c.orig	2020-02-08 10:24:17.692029666 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/mta_session.c	2020-02-24 15:46:46.121342818 -0800
-@@ -1214,7 +1214,7 @@ mta_io(struct io *io, int evt, void *arg
- 		if (cont) {
- 			if (s->replybuf[0] == '\0')
- 				(void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
--			else {
-+			else if (len > 4) {
- 				line = line + 4;
- 				if (isdigit((int)*line) && *(line + 1) == '.' &&
- 				    isdigit((int)*line+2) && *(line + 3) == '.' &&
-@@ -1229,7 +1229,9 @@ mta_io(struct io *io, int evt, void *arg
- 		/* last line of a reply, check if we're on a continuation to parse out status and ESC.
- 		 * if we overflow reply buffer or are not on continuation, log entire last line.
- 		 */
--		if (s->replybuf[0] != '\0') {
-+		if (s->replybuf[0] == '\0')
-+			(void)strlcat(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
-+		else if (len > 4) {
- 			p = line + 4;
- 			if (isdigit((int)*p) && *(p + 1) == '.' &&
- 			    isdigit((int)*p+2) && *(p + 3) == '.' &&
-@@ -1238,8 +1240,6 @@ mta_io(struct io *io, int evt, void *arg
- 			if (strlcat(s->replybuf, p, sizeof s->replybuf) >= sizeof s->replybuf)
- 				(void)strlcpy(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
- 		}
--		else
--			(void)strlcpy(s->replybuf, line, sizeof s->replybuf);
- 
- 		if (s->state == MTA_QUIT) {
- 			log_info("%016"PRIx64" mta event=closed reason=quit messages=%zu",
---- a/smtpd/smtpctl.c.orig	2018-01-10 05:06:40.000000000 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/smtpctl.c	2020-02-24 14:57:04.687320914 -0800
-@@ -1116,7 +1116,7 @@ sendmail_compat(int argc, char **argv)
- 		 */
- 		for (i = 1; i < argc; i++)
- 			if (strncmp(argv[i], "-bi", 3) == 0)
--				exit(makemap(P_NEWALIASES, argc, argv));
-+				exit(makemap(P_SENDMAIL, argc, argv));
- 
- 		if (!srv_connect())
- 			offlinefp = offline_file();
---- a/smtpd/smtpd-defines.h.orig	2018-01-10 05:06:40.000000000 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/smtpd-defines.h	2020-02-24 15:00:29.616322420 -0800
-@@ -46,6 +46,9 @@
- #ifndef PATH_SPOOL
- #define PATH_SPOOL		"/var/spool/smtpd"
- #endif
-+#ifndef PATH_MAKEUP
-+#define PATH_MAKEMAP		"/usr/sbin/makemap"
-+#endif
- 
- #define SUBADDRESSING_DELIMITER	"+"
- 
---- a/smtpd/smtpd.c.orig	2018-01-10 05:06:40.000000000 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/smtpd.c	2020-02-24 15:55:55.503346854 -0800
-@@ -109,9 +109,10 @@ static struct mproc *setup_peer(enum smt
- static int imsg_wait(struct imsgbuf *, struct imsg *, int);
- 
- static void	offline_scan(int, short, void *);
--static int	offline_add(char *);
-+static int	offline_add(char *, uid_t, gid_t);
- static void	offline_done(void);
--static int	offline_enqueue(char *);
-+static int	offline_enqueue(char *, uid_t, gid_t);
-+
- 
- static void	purge_task(void);
- static int	parent_auth_user(const char *, const char *);
-@@ -136,6 +137,8 @@ struct child {
- 
- struct offline {
- 	TAILQ_ENTRY(offline)	 entry;
-+	uid_t			 uid;
-+	gid_t			 gid;
- 	char			*path;
- };
- 
-@@ -1409,7 +1412,8 @@ offline_scan(int fd, short ev, void *arg
- 			continue;
- 		}
- 
--		if (offline_add(e->fts_name)) {
-+		if (offline_add(e->fts_name, e->fts_statp->st_uid,
-+		    e->fts_statp->st_gid)) {
- 			log_warnx("warn: smtpd: "
- 			    "could not add offline message %s", e->fts_name);
- 			continue;
-@@ -1429,7 +1433,7 @@ offline_scan(int fd, short ev, void *arg
- }
- 
- static int
--offline_enqueue(char *name)
-+offline_enqueue(char *name, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
- {
- 	char		*path;
- 	struct stat	 sb;
-@@ -1491,6 +1495,18 @@ offline_enqueue(char *name)
- 			_exit(1);
- 		}
- 
-+		if (sb.st_uid != uid) {
-+			log_warnx("warn: smtpd: file %s has bad uid %d",
-+			    path, sb.st_uid);
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+
-+		if (sb.st_gid != gid) {
-+			log_warnx("warn: smtpd: file %s has bad gid %d",
-+			    path, sb.st_gid);
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-+
- 		pw = getpwuid(sb.st_uid);
- 		if (pw == NULL) {
- 			log_warnx("warn: smtpd: getpwuid for uid %d failed",
-@@ -1547,17 +1563,19 @@ offline_enqueue(char *name)
- }
- 
- static int
--offline_add(char *path)
-+offline_add(char *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
- {
- 	struct offline	*q;
- 
- 	if (offline_running < OFFLINE_QUEUEMAX)
- 		/* skip queue */
--		return offline_enqueue(path);
-+		return offline_enqueue(path, uid, gid);
- 
- 	q = malloc(sizeof(*q) + strlen(path) + 1);
- 	if (q == NULL)
- 		return (-1);
-+	q->uid = uid;
-+	q->gid = gid;
- 	q->path = (char *)q + sizeof(*q);
- 	memmove(q->path, path, strlen(path) + 1);
- 	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&offline_q, q, entry);
-@@ -1576,7 +1594,8 @@ offline_done(void)
- 		if ((q = TAILQ_FIRST(&offline_q)) == NULL)
- 			break; /* all done */
- 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&offline_q, q, entry);
--		offline_enqueue(q->path);
-+		offline_enqueue(q->path, q->uid, q->gid);
-+
- 		free(q);
- 	}
- }
---- a/smtpd/smtpd.h.orig	2018-01-10 05:06:40.000000000 -0800
-+++ b/smtpd/smtpd.h	2020-02-24 15:20:09.043331085 -0800
-@@ -128,8 +128,10 @@
- #define MTA_EXT_DSN		0x400
- 
- 
--#define P_NEWALIASES	0
--#define P_MAKEMAP	1
-+#define P_SENDMAIL	0
-+#define P_NEWALIASES	1
-+#define P_MAKEMAP	2
-+
- 
- struct userinfo {
- 	char username[SMTPD_VUSERNAME_SIZE];
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd66-019-smtpd-exec.patch b/network/opensmtpd/openbsd66-019-smtpd-exec.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 93ce19dcb1..0000000000
--- a/network/opensmtpd/openbsd66-019-smtpd-exec.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-OpenBSD 6.6 errata 019, January 30, 2020:
-
-An incorrect check allows an attacker to trick mbox delivery into executing
-arbitrary commands as root and lmtp delivery into executing arbitrary commands
-as an unprivileged user.
-
---- usr.sbin/smtpd/smtp_session.c	4 Oct 2019 08:34:29 -0000	1.415
-+++ usr.sbin/smtpd/smtp_session.c	26 Jan 2020 05:56:37 -0000
-@@ -2012,24 +2012,22 @@ smtp_mailaddr(struct mailaddr *maddr, ch
- 		memmove(maddr->user, p, strlen(p) + 1);
- 	}
- 
--	if (!valid_localpart(maddr->user) ||
--	    !valid_domainpart(maddr->domain)) {
--		/* accept empty return-path in MAIL FROM, required for bounces */
--		if (mailfrom && maddr->user[0] == '\0' && maddr->domain[0] == '\0')
--			return (1);
-+	/* accept empty return-path in MAIL FROM, required for bounces */
-+	if (mailfrom && maddr->user[0] == '\0' && maddr->domain[0] == '\0')
-+		return (1);
- 
--		/* no user-part, reject */
--		if (maddr->user[0] == '\0')
--			return (0);
--
--		/* no domain, local user */
--		if (maddr->domain[0] == '\0') {
--			(void)strlcpy(maddr->domain, domain,
--			    sizeof(maddr->domain));
--			return (1);
--		}
-+	/* no or invalid user-part, reject */
-+	if (maddr->user[0] == '\0' || !valid_localpart(maddr->user))
- 		return (0);
-+
-+	/* no domain part, local user */
-+	if (maddr->domain[0] == '\0') {
-+		(void)strlcpy(maddr->domain, domain,
-+			sizeof(maddr->domain));
- 	}
-+
-+	if (!valid_domainpart(maddr->domain))
-+		return (0);
- 
- 	return (1);
- }
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.SlackBuild b/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.SlackBuild
index 54a4f8e4cf..afda7fedc1 100644
--- a/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.SlackBuild
+++ b/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.SlackBuild
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@
 #  ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 
 PRGNAM=opensmtpd
-VERSION=${VERSION:-6.0.3p1}
-BUILD=${BUILD:-6}
+VERSION=${VERSION:-6.6.4p1}
+BUILD=${BUILD:-1}
 TAG=${TAG:-_SBo}
 
 if [ -z "$ARCH" ]; then
@@ -92,21 +92,6 @@ find -L . \
  \( -perm 666 -o -perm 664 -o -perm 640 -o -perm 600 -o -perm 444 \
   -o -perm 440 -o -perm 400 \) -exec chmod 644 {} \;
 
-# fix reply buffer overflow
-cat $CWD/openbsd64-020-smtpd.patch | patch -p1
-
-# fix tls downgrade
-cat $CWD/openbsd65-029-smptd-tls.patch | patch -p1
-
-# fix exec
-cat $CWD/openbsd66-019-smtpd-exec.patch | patch -p1
-
-# check null from crypt function
-cat $CWD/fix-crash-on-authentication.patch | patch -p1
-
-# fix smtpctl envelop
-cat $CWD/openbsd65-031-smtpd-envelope.patch | patch -p1
-
 CFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" \
 CXXFLAGS="$SLKCFLAGS" \
 ./configure \
@@ -150,10 +135,16 @@ ln -s smtpctl $PKG/usr/sbin/makemap
 mkdir -p $PKG/etc/rc.d
 cat $CWD/rc.opensmtpd > $PKG/etc/rc.d/rc.opensmtpd.new
 
-# Don't clobber the config file
+# copy original smtpd.conf file
+cp -p $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf.upstream.default
+
+# Don't clobber the existing config file
 mv $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf.new
 # and reflect the correct path to aliases file
-sed -i "s,/etc/mail/,/etc/opensmtpd/,g" $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf.new
+# and use mbox instead of maildir
+sed -i -e "s,/etc/mail/,/etc/opensmtpd/,g" \
+       -e "s,maildir alias,mbox alias,g" \
+     $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/smtpd.conf.new
 
 # Create (but don't clobber) the aliases file
 cat $CWD/aliases > $PKG/etc/opensmtpd/aliases.new
@@ -176,7 +167,7 @@ find $PKG/usr/man -type f -exec gzip -9 {} \;
 for i in $( find $PKG/usr/man -type l ) ; do ln -s $( readlink $i ).gz $i.gz ; rm $i ; done
 
 mkdir -p $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION
-cp -a INSTALL LICENSE README.md THANKS $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION
+cp -a INSTALL LICENSE README.md $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION
 cat $CWD/README             > $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/README.slackware
 cat $CWD/$PRGNAM.SlackBuild > $PKG/usr/doc/$PRGNAM-$VERSION/$PRGNAM.SlackBuild
 
diff --git a/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.info b/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.info
index 0930880299..b8753bc31d 100644
--- a/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.info
+++ b/network/opensmtpd/opensmtpd.info
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 PRGNAM="opensmtpd"
-VERSION="6.0.3p1"
+VERSION="6.6.4p1"
 HOMEPAGE="https://www.opensmtpd.org/"
-DOWNLOAD="https://www.opensmtpd.org/archives/opensmtpd-6.0.3p1.tar.gz"
-MD5SUM="66e496bb0f3303d660744f4fa2178765"
+DOWNLOAD="https://www.opensmtpd.org/archives/opensmtpd-6.6.4p1.tar.gz"
+MD5SUM="4744943277f9a6dc942e7560dbdb5643"
 DOWNLOAD_x86_64=""
 MD5SUM_x86_64=""
 REQUIRES="libasr"