diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server')
4 files changed, 0 insertions, 160 deletions
diff --git a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4008.ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60.patch b/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4008.ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60.patch deleted file mode 100644 index e13edff7..00000000 --- a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4008.ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,52 +0,0 @@ -From ebce7e2d80e7c80e1dda60f2f0bc886f1106ba60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:03 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] render: Fix out of bounds access in - SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs() - -ZDI-CAN-14192, CVE-2021-4008 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> ---- - render/render.c | 9 +++++++++ - 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c -index c376090ca..456f156d4 100644 ---- a/render/render.c -+++ b/render/render.c -@@ -2309,6 +2309,9 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) - - i = elt->len; - if (i == 0xff) { -+ if (buffer + 4 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - swapl((int *) buffer); - buffer += 4; - } -@@ -2319,12 +2322,18 @@ SProcRenderCompositeGlyphs(ClientPtr client) - buffer += i; - break; - case 2: -+ if (buffer + i * 2 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - while (i--) { - swaps((short *) buffer); - buffer += 2; - } - break; - case 4: -+ if (buffer + i * 4 > end) { -+ return BadLength; -+ } - while (i--) { - swapl((int *) buffer); - buffer += 4; --- -GitLab - diff --git a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4009.b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02.patch b/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4009.b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 9a5c3feb..00000000 --- a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4009.b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,43 +0,0 @@ -From b5196750099ae6ae582e1f46bd0a6dad29550e02 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:01 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] xfixes: Fix out of bounds access in - *ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier() - -ZDI-CAN-14950, CVE-2021-4009 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> ---- - xfixes/cursor.c | 6 ++++-- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/xfixes/cursor.c b/xfixes/cursor.c -index 60580b88f..c5d4554b2 100644 ---- a/xfixes/cursor.c -+++ b/xfixes/cursor.c -@@ -1010,7 +1010,8 @@ ProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client) - { - REQUEST(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq); - -- REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices)); -+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, -+ pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16))); - LEGAL_NEW_RESOURCE(stuff->barrier, client); - - return XICreatePointerBarrier(client, stuff); -@@ -1027,7 +1028,8 @@ SProcXFixesCreatePointerBarrier(ClientPtr client) - - swaps(&stuff->length); - swaps(&stuff->num_devices); -- REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices)); -+ REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXFixesCreatePointerBarrierReq, -+ pad_to_int32(stuff->num_devices * sizeof(CARD16))); - - swapl(&stuff->barrier); - swapl(&stuff->window); --- -GitLab - diff --git a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4010.6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21.patch b/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4010.6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 49e23468..00000000 --- a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4010.6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,32 +0,0 @@ -From 6c4c53010772e3cb4cb8acd54950c8eec9c00d21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:02 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Xext: Fix out of bounds access in SProcScreenSaverSuspend() - -ZDI-CAN-14951, CVE-2021-4010 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> ---- - Xext/saver.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/Xext/saver.c b/Xext/saver.c -index 1d7e3cadf..f813ba08d 100644 ---- a/Xext/saver.c -+++ b/Xext/saver.c -@@ -1351,8 +1351,8 @@ SProcScreenSaverSuspend(ClientPtr client) - REQUEST(xScreenSaverSuspendReq); - - swaps(&stuff->length); -- swapl(&stuff->suspend); - REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xScreenSaverSuspendReq); -+ swapl(&stuff->suspend); - return ProcScreenSaverSuspend(client); - } - --- -GitLab - diff --git a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4011.e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768.patch b/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4011.e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 2f3e4197..00000000 --- a/source/x/x11/patch/xorg-server/xorg-server.CVE-2021-4011.e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,33 +0,0 @@ -From e56f61c79fc3cee26d83cda0f84ae56d5979f768 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> -Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2021 15:00:00 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] record: Fix out of bounds access in SwapCreateRegister() - -ZDI-CAN-14952, CVE-2021-4011 - -This vulnerability was discovered and the fix was suggested by: -Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative - -Signed-off-by: Povilas Kanapickas <povilas@radix.lt> ---- - record/record.c | 4 ++-- - 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c -index be154525d..e123867a7 100644 ---- a/record/record.c -+++ b/record/record.c -@@ -2516,8 +2516,8 @@ SwapCreateRegister(ClientPtr client, xRecordRegisterClientsReq * stuff) - swapl(pClientID); - } - if (stuff->nRanges > -- client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) -- - stuff->nClients) -+ (client->req_len - bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRegisterClientsReq) -+ - stuff->nClients) / bytes_to_int32(sz_xRecordRange)) - return BadLength; - RecordSwapRanges((xRecordRange *) pClientID, stuff->nRanges); - return Success; --- -GitLab - |